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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
JACOB ROSS HALE,

Case No. 990939-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant

ARGUMENT
ISSUE: THE BAILIFFS' STATEMENTS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE
JURORS CONSTITUTES A CONSEQUENTIAL REMARK GIVING RISE
TO AN UNREBUTTED PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE.
The State asserts that there was no consequential juror
contact such that a presumption of prejudice arose in Appellant
Jacob Hale f s ("Hale") trial.
19.

See State's Brief ("S.B.") at 13-

The State's position is without merit.
A.

The Bailiffs' Remarks Constitute a "Contact."

The State asserts "this case does not involve a contact, let
alone a conversation, between a juror and a trial participant."
S.B. 14.

"Accordingly, . . . the trial court reasonably

determined that a mistrial was unwarranted."
omitted).

S.B. 15 (footnote

The State's assertion oversimplifies the term

"contact" as it is used in Utah case law.
As an initial matter, the remark "guilty, guilty, guilty" is
a "contact" to the extent that it was uttered in the immediate
presence of the jury and at least one juror overheard it and
could testify to it when questioned by the trial judge.
R.247[120,130].

As such, the remark was communicated to at least

{

one of the jurors, rendering it a contact.

See Webster's New

World College Dictionary (4th ed.) (defining "contact" as "the
state or fact of being in touch, communication, or association
(with)").
In addition, a comment need not be a verbal exchange or a
conversation with a juror in order to be a "contact" under Utah
case law.

The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277,

280 (Utah 1985), and State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620, 621 (Utah
1987), does not limit its holdings to conversations alone.
Rather, the Court specifically refers to "contacts," recognizing
that any sort of communication, one-way or two-way, may prejudice
a defendant if it is improper.

Pike, 712 P.2d at 280; see also

Erickson, 749 P.2d at 621 ("prejudice will be presumed from any
contact")

(emphasis added).

Accordingly, the mere fact that the

bailiffs were not conversing with the jury when the remark was
made does not render it a non-contact.

R.247[129-31].

"The

'scope and subject matter [of the contact], . . .' so long as
more than mere pleasantries, . . . [is] irrelevant."

Logan City

v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224, 227 (Utah App. 1990) (Orme, J.,
concurring). .
Finally, a contact need not be with a "trial participant" to
fall under Pike.

See Carlsen, 799 P.2d at 226.

This Court has

already rejected such a proposition, stating, "the [Utah] Supreme
Court made no such distinction and precluded any unauthorized

2

contact by witnesses, attorneys or court

personnel."

Id. at 226

(rejecting appellee's argument that "no prejudice occurred
because the incident involved a bailiff rather than a witness for
the state, as was the case in Erickson and Pike") (citing State
v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620, 621 (Utah 1987)) (emphasis added); see
also State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1349 (Utah App. 1991)
(declining to address propriety of contact by bailiff on
preservation grounds).

In so reasoning, this Court held that

statements made by a bailiff, appropriately characterized as
"court personnel," which touched upon the issue of sentencing
were consequential and merited a mistrial.
226-27.

Carlsen, 799 P.2d at

By the same reasoning, the remark in this case, made by

a bailiff who is "court personnel," implicates the Pike rule.
In light of the foregoing, the State's assertion that the
remark did not amount to a contact is without merit.
B. The Bailiffs1 Remarks Are Consequential And Give
Rise To A Presumption of Prejudice.
The State erroneously asserts that the "guilty, guilty,
guilty" remark was not consequential.

S.B.16-17; R.247[130].

A

remark is consequential, giving rise to a rebuttable presumption
of prejudice, when it goes beyond a mere incidental, unintended,
and brief contact.
at 621.

See Pike, 712 P.2d at 280; Erickson, 749 P.2d

A remark rises to the level of consequential if it is

something other than a mere "civility," Erickson, 749 P.2d at
621, such as " f Hello f or

f

Good morning. 1 " State v. Jonas, 793
3

(

P.2d 902, 909 (Utah App. 1990); see also Carlsen, 799 P.2d at 227
Cany contact [gives rise to rebuttable presumption of prejudice

(

if] 'more than a brief incidental contact where only remarks of
civility are exchanged1") (citing Erickson, 749 P.2d at 621)
(Orme, J., concurring) .

<

In light of the foregoing, and for the reasons set forth in
Hale's opening brief ("A.B."), the "guilty, guilty, guilty"
remark was anything but a mere civility.
R.247[130].

See A.B. 17-21;

'

Indeed, the comment touched on a sensitive issue

going to the crux of the trial - the guilt-or-innocence question.
Id. at 17; see also Carlsen, 799 P.2d at 226 (mistrial required
where bailiff's comment to jury, although not related to specific
case, "touched on the extremely sensitive issue of sentencing").
For this reason, the State's reliance upon Jonas, 793 P.2d
at 908, is misplaced.

See S.B. 16-17.

The statement at issue in

Jonas was an explanation made by a bailiff to the jury about the
absence of another juror.

793 P.2d at 908.1

This Court held it

was "an incidental contact raising no presumption of prejudice"
because "no 'conversation' took place, in the normal sense of an
'oral exchange of sentiments, observations, opinions [or]
ideas.'" Id. at 908-09.

Moreover, the content of the remark had

only a "tenuous connection to the subject of the trial."

1

Id. at

The bailiff involved in Jonas stated, "'I went in and I
told them that Mr. Davis wouldn't be in because his sister was
the lady that was shot out in West Valley.'" 793 P.2d at 908.

4

909.

Hence, the comment did not affect "the jury's judgment

regarding their verdict" nor did it lend and "any appearance of
impropriety" to the trial.

Id. at 909-10.

The phrase "guilty,

guilty, guilty," R.247[130], by contrast, communicates a strong
and central idea in the criminal setting and, therefore, bears a
direct relationship to the subject of Hale's trial.
A more instructive case is Carlsen, wherein this Court held
that remarks from a bailiff, although not directly touching on
the specific case, gave rise to an unrebutted presumption of
prejudice.

See 799 P.2d at 226.

The bailiff's remark concerned

the "difference between circuit and district court jurisdiction,
and the sentences for misdemeanors and felonies."

Id.

In

holding that a mistrial was merited, the Court stated,
We find it particularly troublesome that the
unauthorized conversation between the bailiff and the
jury concerned the sensitive subject of sentencing.
The juror's minds should be free of extraneous thought
as to possible sentences because such thought would
tend to interfere with their concentration on
defendant's guilt or innocence.
Id. at 227.
For the same reasons set forth in Carlsen, the remark at
issue here is consequential in that it touches upon the sensitive
issue of guilt.

Id.

The juror's thought processes should have

been focused on the facts of the case without the infecting
overlay of the "guilty, guilty, guilty" remark ringing in their
minds.

Id.; R.247[130].

To the extent that the jury was

5

infected with this bias toward guilt, Hale's right to a fair
trial by an impartial jury was compromised.

Accordingly, the

(

trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial.2
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, and for the reasons set forth in
Hale f s opening brief, Hale respectfully requests this Court to
reverse the lower court's denial of his suppression motion and
his motion for a new trial, and remand for further proceedings.
SUBMITTED this

f^aJt

day of September, 2000.
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Hale submits on his opening brief in response to the
State's argument that any presumption of prejudice was adequately
rebutted, see A.B. 17-21, as well as its argument concerning the
trial court's erroneous denial of his motion to suppress
unreliable and tainted identification testimony. See A.B. Point
II.
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